



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

some particular way of life or some type of character which is alone virtuous, and which ought to be propagated. Alas, their propagandas! How they have filled this world with hatred, darkness, and blood! How they are still the eternal obstacle, in every home and in every heart, to a simple happiness! I have no wish to propagate any particular character, least of all my own; my conceit does not take that form. I wish individuals, and races, and nations to be themselves, and to multiply the forms of perfection and happiness, as nature prompts them. The only thing which I think might be propagated without injustice to the types thereby suppressed is harmony; enough harmony to prevent the interference of one type with another, and to allow the perfect development of each type. The good, as I conceive it, is happiness, happiness for each man after his own heart, and for each hour according to its inspiration. I should dread to transplant my happiness into other people; it might die in that soil; and my critics are the first to tell me that my sort of happiness is a poor thing in their estimation. Well and good. Let them take their own course: but how should I be able to speed them on it against my judgment? They do not place their happiness in the things I have, or can give. My theory of the ideal, and my experience of it, assure me that it is an adventitious denomination and a moral category. Anything is an ideal, whether existent or non-existent, if it fulfills the demands of some living being. Let, then, every soul consider what it requires and in what things it might find an unpoisoned happiness. No man can set up an ideal for another, nor labor to realize it for him, save by his leave or as his spokesman, perhaps more ready with the right word. To find the comparatively right word, my critics seem to agree, is my art. Do I not practise it for their benefit as best I can? Should I leave writing, and go and dig? Is it I who am indifferent to the being of light? Who loves it more, or basks in it more joyfully? And do I do nothing that the light may come? Is it I who tremble lest at its coming it should dissolve the creatures begotten in darkness? Ah, I know why my critics murmur and are dissatisfied. I have no earnestness. I do not endeavor to deceive myself, nor to deceive them, nor to aid them in deceiving themselves. They will never prevail on me to do that. I am a disciple of Socrates.

GEORGE SANTAYANA.

A DISCUSSION OF "MIND DISCERNED"

AFTER reading Professor Woodbridge's interesting account¹ of the basis of interpretation by a determinate mind of the total universe of discourse, I find in myself the same attitude to-

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. XVIII, No. 13, pp. 337-347.

ward his viewpoint that he felt toward the passage from Santayana which he quoted. I should not care to defend an opposite standpoint. I feel the "haunting suggestiveness" of all that he says. It is because I believe that he would extend his argument so as to reach certain uncongenial conclusions that I venture to state what I believe to be its true implications.

Professor Woodbridge's chief point is that the possibility of interpretation rests, not upon the fact that determinate minds inhabit certain animal bodies, but on the fact that the transcendental mind has or *is* a structural unity, *i.e.*, that the total universe of discourse is characterized by a logical structure that is real. I find no difficulty in such a proposition. I would pass on at once to consider the function of the determinate mind in interpretation were it not for a certain ambiguity which appears in a comparison of "Mind Discerned" with a previous article, "Structure."² In "Mind Discerned" it is noted that the physicist, the psychologist, and the plain man all deal with the same subject-matter. Here the constant character of the total universe of discourse appears to be based on the persistence of certain fundamental qualities which compose its subject-matter and which may be talked about, although interpreted variously. On the other hand, in "Structure" the logical web of relations is declared to be the one element of the universe that is discoverable and permanent. It is implied that subject-matter is in constant flux, and that qualities are convertible into one another. Now I can not believe that Professor Woodbridge would attempt to evolve "matter" out of "form," and this belief leads me to suggest a reconciling principle, which he states in another connection, namely, that subject-matter and interpretation are never divorced. The qualities, therefore, that are momentarily embodied in a specific structure, can not exist apart from some embodiment, nor can the structure exist apart from the subject-matter that is embodied. You can not separate the qualities of a watch from its structure.

In the total universe of discourse different types of structure appear to embody subject-matter in characteristic ways. In any inquiry, therefore, we have to consider both the type of structure involved and the qualities which the structure embodies. Let us do this in respect to the determinate mind.

Professor Woodbridge notes that interpretation occurs only in connection with animal bodies. He admits with Bergson their "privileged character," that the scope of inquiry is extended by their ability to move about. He finds the possibility of interpreta-

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 25, pp. 680-688.

tion to rest upon a congeniality of structure which applies both to them and to the objects interpreted. He *seems*, however, to exclude the determinate mind (understanding by this no more than the nervous system) as a chief factor in interpretation. One of the grounds of such exclusion is the fact that the animal body may be studied just as other objects, all lying within the same universe of discourse. Granting that the initial possibility of interpretation is due to the structure of the total universe of discourse, mind in the transcendental sense, let us proceed to examine the behavior of the human body when interpretation occurs. Quite aside from any "subjective" implications, we may observe two persons make two distinct drawings of the same object, and we may observe that the drawings, apart from technical accuracy, differ markedly in character. Or we may listen to two individuals make different sounds to denote the color of the same object. We have here, evidenced in behavior, a diversity of interpretations. To what is the difference of interpretations due? Consider the form of these examples. It is not assumed that certain ideas of a determinate mind get united with a constant subject-matter. We point rather to two diverse interpretations lying within the same universe of discourse. In Professor Woodbridge's language, we have differences due to the universe as a whole which may imply no more than the interdependence of its parts.

As I have stated, I agree that the possibility of interpretation, meaning genuine understanding, lies in the presence of congeniality of structure between the reacting organism and the subject-matter reacted to. It is to be expected that psycho-physical monism, in its further development, will do much toward making clear the nature of this congeniality. But I can not account for the variability of interpretation without assuming that the reacting organism is a powerful factor in whatever interpretation is made. If one and only one interpretation were made in each instance, the interpretation might be explained by referring to a structure common to both organism and environment. In such a case, the functioning of the reacting organism would be passive. But since many interpretations are possible, some of which are branded later as true, some as false, it is most natural to ascribe the divergency, which at times may attain to error, to the part played by the reacting organism.

Another fact which leads me to believe that animal bodies are not on a par with other objects as objects of study is that I can not predict their total reactions as I predict chemical reactions. The behavior of an animal body in the presence of other objects would

therefore seem to be due to factors within the body, rather than to observable features. Thus, the distinctive characteristic of higher animal organisms, the nervous system, would appear to be important in cases where interpretation occurs, not only for its commonness of structure and subject-matter with other objects in the total universe, but also for its own distinctive structure and subject-matter.

It is easy, I believe, to point out cases where structure is embodied in subject-matter, both of which are peculiar to animal bodies. I am on a par with other human bodies in being capable of making interpretations. Now within the total universe of discourse are my emotions and feelings. I can not, however, observe them, or similar items in the universe, in connection with any animal body other than my own. I can, it is true, observe reactions of the body in others which are similar to those that I make in what I conceive to be similar situations, and I infer that similar emotions and feelings are present in connection with bodies other than my own. But I can not perceive them. I do not regard this fact as indicating the need of postulating a supernatural mind, for I believe that if I had the means I could view the emotions and feelings of others as items in the one universe of discourse. But from the facts that emotions and feelings *do* differ "as objects of study" from other objects, and that they are hidden from me save in connection with my own body, I believe that I should find them, not as items common to bodies and other objects in the total universe, but as qualities embodied in the animal brain. I am forced to conclude, therefore, that emotions and feelings are subject-matter located in a particular time and space, appearing to any individual immediately only in introspection, and mediately as nerve-tissue.

The same argument might be applied in the case of certain sensations, notably those of touch and temperature. I prefer here, however, to enlarge upon the theme of difference of interpretation of the same subject-matter by different individuals. As science progresses, qualities seem less stable than structure. To the physicist, the leaf of a tree becomes an organization of molecules, these in turn being regarded as organizations of atoms and electrons. As, however, "form" and "matter" are always conjoined, subject-matter never entirely disappears, although it may degenerate into the subject-matter of formulae. But where the existent universe is talked of, some conception of an ultimate substance (not in the metaphysical sense) remains. Now even if qualities are shown to be thus fleeting, they are real in so far as they are themselves. Further, if I am able to refer to a green leaf as subject-matter and

am not under some hallucination, but react to an object, some continuity of structure of my reacting organism with that of the other object, "tree," must be presupposed. Now one of the characteristics of structure is that it is discovered. I learn what it is when I have for some time "come up against it." So that just as I may not expect to discover the molecular structure of a leaf by simple inspection, so I must not expect to discover the structure that underlies the quality "green" by mere observation. I can experience it, possibly exhibit it, but its fundamental structure will be discovered if it be known at all.

Common psychological data lead me to connect green with the reacting organism rather than with the other object "leaf." And so, just as the watch has its own structure, I conclude that the structure of "green" is peculiar to certain animal bodies. This conclusion implies no supernatural mind. It means, rather, that if I were able to inspect the structure of the human nervous system, I should perceive there a complex of subject-matter and structure which I know as "green," and which I may call a green-sensation. But owing to the fact that I am unable to inspect either my own or another's nervous system to the fullest extent so as to disclose its characteristic structure, I am able to know a green-sensation only *as it functions* in my own reacting organism.

I conclude, therefore, that, although the possibility of all interpretation may be said to rest on a community of structure between all objects, animal bodies, and especially the human body, have organs that possess a characteristic matter and form of their own. This "privileged character" of animals possessing a nervous system is important in deciding what is the nature of objects in the total universe of discourse in which nervous systems are included. Epistemology is that branch of philosophy which endeavors to set these matters straight. It does not attempt to divorce subject-matter and interpretation, but to examine the nature of certain of their offspring.

MAURICE PICARD.

BARNARD COLLEGE.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Les Philosophies Pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique. JEAN WAHL. Paris: Alcan. 1920. Pp. 323.

M. Wahl has given us in this volume an interesting and competent study of one of the recent tendencies in English and American thought. His discussion of contemporary pluralistic philosophies is divided into five sections. The first section treats of the monisms